LABORATOIRE BORDELAIS DE RECHERCHE EN INFORMATIQUE

LaBRI

cnrs

université de BORDEAUX

AUPE: Collaborative Byzantine fault-tolerant peer-sampling

NCA'24

Augusta Mukam, Joachim Bruneau-Queyreix, Laurent Réveillère

Large scale distributed systems

- No central tracking for peer discovery



Large scale distributed systems

- No central tracking for peer discovery
- **Gossip-based peer sampling**
  - Aim: Maintain knowledge of active nodes
  - For selecting and providing random & uniform samples of identifiers (IDs)



Gossip-based peer sampling service

- Each node has a local **View**



Gossip-based peer sampling service

- Each node has a local **View**
- Periodically:
  - Exchange **Push** and **Pull** requests
  - Update view



Gossip-based peer sampling service

- Each node has a local **View**
- Periodically:
  - Exchange **Push** and **Pull** requests
  - Update view
- Global network connectivity



Problem

- Group of malicious/Byzantine nodes
- Promote nodes within their member group



Problem

- Group of malicious/Byzantine nodes
- Promote nodes within their member group
- Increase their representation in honest nodes views



Problem

- Group of malicious/Byzantine nodes
- Promote nodes within their member group
- Increase their representation in honest nodes views

Eg: Bitcoin Eclipse attack

- **Corrupted version of blockchain**
- **Manipulate their tokens**



Problem

- Group of malicious/Byzantine nodes
- Promote nodes within their member group
- Increase their representation in honest nodes views





Fault-detection

- Identify malicious nodes based on misbehavior proofs
- Punish faulty nodes
- Lead to major disruption

Fault-tolerance

- Tolerate malicious nodes
- Prevent them from polluting the system

Fault-tolerance

- Tolerate malicious nodes
- Prevent them from polluting the system
- **Brahms,** extension **Basalt**

Fault-tolerance

- Tolerate malicious nodes
- Prevent them from polluting the system
- **Brahms,** extension **Basalt**

Brahms

f=26% malicious nodes

77% malicious IDs in honest node views

Fault-tolerance

- Tolerate malicious nodes
- Prevent them from polluting the system
- **Brahms,** extension **Basalt**

Brahms

f=26% malicious nodes

↓

77% malicious IDs in honest node views

Basalt

Better than Brahms for **f< 20%**

Results get worse rapidly

BRAHMS overview

Gossip component

- Handle push/pull requests
- View update



BRAHMS overview

Gossip component

- Share knowledge
- View update

Sampling component

- Uniform sample of seen nodes



Motivation

- ➔ Received streams of identifiers are source of bias
- ➔ **Mitigate Byzantine over representation**



AUPE Protocol

- Based on BRAHMS components
- **AUPE Set Cleaner** 
  - Produces less biased streams



AUPE Protocol

- Based on BRAHMS components
- **AUPE Set Cleaner** 
  - Produces less biased streams
- **AUPE Secret Collaborative debiasing** 
  - Enhance the local debiasing mechanism



Dynamic View

AUPE Set Cleaner 

Tracking component

- Record occurrences of received IDs in a tracking data-structure

AUPE Set Cleaner 

Tracking component

- Record occurrences of received IDs in a tracking data-structure

Tracking data-structure

Key-value store	Count-min-sketches
• Give real occurrences • Same size as the system	• Probabilistic data-structure • Give estimate occurrences • Fixed-size

AUPE Set Cleaner

Tracking component

- Record occurrences of received IDs in a tracking data-structure



Occurrence of node i (real or estimated): Occ_i

AUPE Set Cleaner 

Debiasing component

- Transforms received stream to a more uniform one
- Probability of inserting into **sample memory**

Probability of insertion of ID i : p_i
Minimum of all occurrences : min

$$p_i = \frac{min}{Occ_i}$$

AUPE Set Cleaner 

Debiasing component

- Transforms received stream to a more uniform one
- Probability of inserting into **sample memory**
- Sample memory IDs form the output stream

Probability of insertion of ID i : p_i
Minimum of all occurrences : min

$$p_i = \frac{min}{Occ_i}$$

AUPE Set Cleaner review

- Choose infrequent IDs more often
- Improve correct node tolerance to malicious over-representation



AUPE Set Cleaner review

- Choose infrequent IDs more often
- Improve correct node tolerance to malicious over-representation



Increase of Brahms tolerance by up to 60%

AUPE Secret Collaborative Debiasing 

- System is equipped with **Trusted nodes**
  - Based on TEE technology: authenticity of the code
  - **Secure mutual authentication** to recognize trusted peers

AUPE Secret Collaborative Debiasing 

- System is equipped with **Trusted nodes**
  - Based on TEE technology: authenticity of the code
  - **Secure mutual authentication** to recognize trusted peers
- **Exchange** and **merge** their tracking components
- Enhance the debiasing mechanism of the Set Cleaner

AUPE Secret Collaborative Debiasing

- **Merge** ⊕ : Aggregate two tracking components
  - **Average** computation of each corresponding entries



AUPE Secret Collaborative Debiasing 

- **Merge**  : Aggregate two tracking components
  - **Average** computation of each corresponding entries
- **Trusted peer list**
  - M last known trusted peer IDs to recontact

Evaluation questions

- To what extent does **Aupe-simple** (without Merge) improve the tolerance ?
- What is the impact of the **secret collaborative debiasing** ?
- Compare to **Brahms**, **Basalt**

Experimental evaluation

Metric

- **Resilience:** proportion of Byzantine IDs in honest node views at last round
- **Optimal Case:** system resilience is equal to system proportion of Byzantine nodes

Experimental evaluation

Parameters

- System size **N**=10,000
- Fraction **f** of faulty nodes
- Fraction **t** of trusted nodes
- Tracking component : Key-value store

System Tolerance improvement

Aupe-simple



System Tolerance improvement

Aupe-simple



f=26%

➔ **40%** on Brahms
➔ **52%** on Basalt

View parts tolerance improvement

Aupe-simple



f=26%



68% of Improvement

View' Pull part

Collaborative debiasing

Aupe with t=10%, 20% and 30%

- Good impact of collaborative debiasing



Conclusion

- **AUPE**  
  - The first peer sampling that utilizes **Collaborative trusted debiasing** to achieve Byzantine-tolerance
- Near-perfect resilience
  - Even with adversary controlling **26%** of nodes

Conclusion

- **AUPE**  
  - The first peer sampling that utilizes **Collaborative trusted debiasing** to achieve Byzantine-tolerance
- Near-perfect resilience
  - Even with adversary controlling **26%** of nodes
- Study trusted node re-identification attack

LABORATOIRE BORDELAIS DE RECHERCHE EN INFORMATIQUE

LaBRI

cnrs

université de BORDEAUX

AUPE: Collaborative Byzantine fault-tolerant peer-sampling

NCA'24

Augusta Mukam, Joachim Bruneau-Queyreix, Laurent Réveillère

References

- *E. Bortnikov, M. Gurevich, I. Keidar, G. Kliot, and A. Shraer, "**Brahms**: Byzantine resilient random membership sampling," in Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, ser. **PODC** '08. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2008, p. 145–154.*
- *E. Anceaume, Y. Busnel, and B. Sericola, "**Uniform node sampling service** robust against collusions of malicious nodes," in 2013 43rd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (**DSN**), 2013, pp. 1–12*
- *M. Jelasity, A. Montresor, and O. Babaoglu, "**Gossip-based aggregation in large dynamic networks**," ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., vol. 23, no. 3, p. 219–252, aug 2005.*
- *A. Auvolat, Y.-D. Bromberg, D. Frey, D. Mvondo, and F. Taïani, "**Basalt**: A rock-solid byzantine-tolerant peer sampling for very large decentralized networks," in Proceedings of the 24th International Middleware Conference, ser. Middleware '23. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2023, p. 111–123.*